A GAO report issued on May 22, 2008 (GAO-08-821T, HIGH-CONTAINMENT BIOSAFETY LABORATORIES, DHS Lacks Evidence to Conclude that Foot-and-Mouth Disease Research Can be Done Safely on the U.S. Mainland reviews the background of foot and mouth disease (FMD) research in the U.S. and elsewhere. This report questions the basis for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) support for the movement of FMD virus and research from the current location at Plum Island Animal Disease Research Center (PIADC) to the newly announced National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) site managed by Kansas State University. In the GAO report, concern was raised regarding a study where DHS relied on a secondary study that the United States of Agriculture (USDA) commissioned and that a contractor conducted in May 2002. This study examined the question of whether it is technically feasible to conduct exotic disease research and diagnostics, including FMD and rinderpest, on the U.S. mainland with adequate biosafety and biosecurity to protect U.S. agriculture? Some significant problems existed in the conduct of this study. Nonetheless, DHS continues to cite to this study as supporting the closing of PIADC, and being the basis of support for the $450 million facility funded to Kansas State University. Various concerns are raised by GAO regarding this USDA study and the readership of this blog is encouraged to read the report in detail and the GAO criticisms.

At the heart of the debate is the question as to what existing laws and statutes govern the site for FMD research in the United States? DHS assumed control of PIADC on June 1, 2003 based on authority granted by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. On January 30, 2004 DHS was instructed by Homeland Security Presidential Directive / HSPD-9 (Defense of United States Agriculture and Food) to undertake several actions to protect United States agriculture and food systems, and improve infrastructure to both natural and intentional acts which would erode U.S. agriculture. DHS has identified PIADC as “reaching the end of its life cycle”, and as lacking critical capabilities to continue as the primary facility for such work. DHS initiated actions to replace PIADC which was judged as antiquated using the following authority, specifically clause (24), cited from HSPD-9.

Research and Development (numbers in parenthesis are paragraph markings as appearing in HSPD-9)

(23) The Secretaries of Homeland Security, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, will accelerate and expand development of current and new countermeasures against the intentional introduction or natural occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases. The Secretary of Homeland Security will coordinate these activities. This effort will include countermeasure research and development of new methods for detection, prevention technologies, agent characterization, and dose response relationships for high-consequence agents in the food and the water supply.

(24) The Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security will develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.

(25) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, shall establish university-based centers of excellence in agriculture and food security.

The above citation is very important at several levels. Nowhere in HSPD-9 is FMD mentioned directly. However, DHS states authoritatively that FMD virus and research will be housed at the NBAF. The Secretary of Agriculture is directed to assist DHS in plans to upgrade biocontainment and diagnostic capabilities without reference to other legal obligations. Most importantly, nowhere in HSPD-9 is it mentioned that PIADC should be closed and research relocated. This brings us to the point of asking: what exactly is the authority conveyed through a Presidential Directive? These documents are referred to in different ways in Presidential Directives depending on the administration occupying the Executive Office. From the White House briefing room we cite: “PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS In this section you will find official actions by the President that have a significant impact on how the federal government functions but do not require legislation or Congressional approval . . . ”

Herein is the problem and this problem was referenced, but not detailed, by the GAO study. FAD research and the legal justification to establish and maintain PIADC is well documented in 21 USC 113a. United States Code (U.S.C.) is a compilation and codification of the general and permanent federal law of the United States. Specifically 21 USC 113a states:

“The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to establish research laboratories, including the acquisition of necessary land, buildings, or facilities, and also the making of research contracts under the authority contained in section 427i(a) of title 7, for research and study, in the United States or elsewhere, of foot-and-mouth disease and other animal diseases which in the opinion of the Secretary constitute a threat to the livestock industry of the United States: Provided, that no live virus of foot-and-mouth disease may be introduced for any purpose into any part of the mainland of the United States (except coastal islands separated therefrom by water navigable for deep-water navigation and which shall not be connected with the mainland by any tunnel) unless the Secretary determines that it is necessary and in the public interest for the conduct of research and study in the United States (except at Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, New York) and issues a permit under such rules as the Secretary shall promulgate to protect animal health, except that the Secretary of Agriculture may transport said virus in the original package across the mainland under adequate safeguards, and except further, that in the event of outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in this country, the Secretary of Agriculture may, at his discretion, permit said virus to be brought into the United States under adequate safeguards.”

The above is literally the law of the land, and violations of this law are punishable through an assortment of penalties including Contempt of Congress. Returning to the topic, where exactly did DHS assume precedent to establish and award the NBAF contract? From the prior discussion the legal precedent is very clear – - only the Secretary of Agriculture or Congress can allow FMD virus to be moved from PIADC onto the mainland. This was established by law in 1949, and this law is still on the books and in effect. With reference to the Secretary of Agriculture, two questions arise. With the erosion of authority over FMD virus research, does USDA, or DHS, assume the obligations of indemnification should FMD escape biocontainment and damage U.S. agriculture? What is the consequence of actions by the current Secretary of Agriculture on binding commitments made by future Secretaries of Agriculture? Should plans for NBAF proceed and the existing PIADC be razed on the basis of “reaching the end of its life cycle”, and as lacking critical capabilities to continue as the primary facility for such work just to have a future Secretary of Agriculture reverse the decision, the ugly reality emerges of “what options exist”? In short, none! And, US agriculture will lack a FMD research program which could assist in vaccine development should this FAD occur at some time in the future.

This leaves open the question of: why has the U.S. Congress not been proactive in the award of the NBAF facility contract, and why is Congress not diligent in the enforcement of existing U.S. Code? Without bias, we assume that FMD research is suitably placed at PIADC consistent with existing law. Moreover, infrastructure upgrades could revitalize this facility, possibly at a fraction the cost of a site based on the mainland. NBAF is currently funded at an estimated cost of $450 million, which is considerable. However, an estimated loss of $1 billion could occur to the economy of the State of Kansas should FMD virus escape containment and impact the State. The latter figure was derived from a Kansas State University publication (Pendell et al., The Economic Impacts of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak: A Regional Analysis. J. Agricultural and Applied Economics, 39:19-33. 2007).

In conclusion, a key question remains unanswered – - why is this blog the only source asking these questions?

On June 22, 2008, the Star Tribune newspaper (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota) published an article, “Is Labeling Milk as Free of Hormones a Bad Idea“, written by Lou Gelfand. The story is great example of the lousy and slanted journalism being practiced that focuses on agricultural biotechnology … in this case, rbST and milk labeling.

I have written about bad science journalism before. It continues to mystify me why some journalists fail to practice accurate and informative journalism. Must be easier to present a bias, distort the truth and mislead readers.

Enjoy the response that Ms. Bunting sent to the Star Tribune.

# # # #

As a 28-year veteran journalist, I find several inaccuracies in your article about milk labeling.

First, record high milk prices do not mean good income for dairy farmers. They are facing record high prices for all inputs — particularly feed, fuel, and fertilizer — surging farther and faster than milk prices (up 35-75% over year ago). The U.S. Department of Agriculture figures that dairy farms are profitable when the milk-feed ratio is 3.0 or above. Currently, it is 1.7!

Second, the dairy price support program does not “buoy” milk prices. This very low “floor” on the price of milk has not been triggered in years and it has not been adjusted for inflation. It is a non-factor.

Third, I am from Pennsylvania and our Sec of Agriculture did not “retreat.” A compromise was reached. Bottlers are prohibited from making “absence claims.” They are allowed to make production-related claims only, such as “produced from cows not treated with rbST.” They may not say “hormone free.” In addition, the FDA disclaimer stating no distinguishable difference in the milk must also appear on the label in a font size at least half the size of the claim.

Fourth, the countries mentioned do not ban products from cows treated with rbST (Posilac), they ban their farmers from using it because they market milk in a supply management or quota system. In Canada, for example, dairy farmers buy the right to sell a certain “quota” of milk. This keeps the supply tight and the price high to farmers. A production efficiency tool like rbST is certainly not going to be allowed by a nation that uses supply management.

Fifth, technologies that safely boost production efficiency are conserving our natural resources by producing more with less. In case you have not noticed, the U.S. and World population is expanding and our land base for producing food is shrinking. What could be more “green” than producing more milk with fewer cows, requiring less feed, less land to grow the feed, less manure waste nutrient to manage, etc. You get my drift.

Sixth, the only “sweet bonus” here is the one the retailers are collecting from consumers for “hormone-free” milk when actually all milk contains protein hormones as does nearly every food on the planet — plant or animal. There is no distinguishable difference between naturally occurring bovine somatotropin in the cow and the synthetic hormone used to supplement the cow. These cows actually benefit with greater longevity as they are producing milk at a profitable level for a longer period of time, so a farmer can afford to keep feeding and caring for a cow that does not breed back when she should for her next lactation. In those cases, if the milk production falls to a certain level and she is not with calf for another lactation, she would be sold for beef.

You see, rbST is not the “evil demon” activists and lately, journalists, seem to want to make it out to be. But of course, there are simply not enough journalists today with a solid background in science to discern the truth, and even fewer who truly understand agriculture and razor thin margins farmers operate on.

Sixty-six university dairy and veterinary scientists launched a broad attack Monday against milk processors and retail marketers who increasingly seek to advertise and label milk produced by cows not treated with Monsanto’s recombinant bovine somatotropin. A letter from professors at nearly every major land grant university asserted there was no difference between conventional and “rBST-free” or organic milk but that consumers were being misled by emotional advertising claims to pay higher prices.

“Organic and ‘rBST-free’ milk are routinely advertised as being somehow healthier, less risky, more environmentally friendly, and produced by ‘happier’ cows than conventional milk,” the scientists’ letter said. “Consumers are led to believe that organic milk is better, or that ‘rbST-free’ milk is safer. The truth is quite different, but behind these claims are very powerful corporate interests that know that they can sell the same product at a higher price if they can create doubt or spread fear about conventional milk.”

The letter was coordinated by dairy medicine Prof. John Fetrow of the University of Minnesota and Dairy and Animal Science Department Head Terry D. Etherton of Penn State and signed by leading academics including Dale Bauman of Cornell University in New York, one of the pioneers in studying rBST. They cited a recent study in which more than 200 different samples of conventional, “rBST-free” and organic milk from retail stores across the U.S. were tested by audited procedures and found to have the same nutrient content and identical levels of the estrogen, IGF-1, bST. None contained antibiotics.

“It is easy to scare people by using the word ‘hormone,’ but all milk contains hormones and always has,” the letter said. “The levels of these hormones are the same in whatever milk you drink, and their presence poses no health risk to humans. Vitamin D is a steroid hormone and is added to milk. Milk also contains protein hormones, such as bovine somatotropin (also called bST or bovine growth hormone, BGH) and IGF-1. Both are present in tiny quantities in milk, are digested just like any other protein you eat (steak or tofu), and have no effect in people when eaten.”

The anti-rBST campaign was “particularly deceptive,” it said. “The vague and unsupportable assertions about ‘cancer’ or ‘antibiotic resistance’ (bST is not an antibiotic) are simply not scientifically credible. Oft-repeated smear campaigns can, however, gradually shape the public’s perceptions, and major food corporations understand the power of fear in selling food.”

The scientists asserted that “corporate interests can increase their profits if people fear conventional milk. They can make more money selling ‘rbST-free’ milk at $4/gallon or organic milk at $6/gallon (or more) than by selling conventional milk at $3/gallon, and the majority of that profit differential stays in the corporation’s hands.” The letter singled out Dean Foods, the largest fluid milk marketer, and Whole Foods Markets, the largest organic grocery chain, for financing the Organic Center, which “spreads fear and disinformation about conventional milk and other products of conventional agriculture” and touts products from Dean-owned Horizon Organic and Whole Foods.

The letter was released one week before an Ohio state review committee was to hold a hearing on a new regulation that would restrict “rBST-free” labeling and require a prominent label disclaimer that the milk is no different. It also would mandate record-keeping to verify the claim. The controversy has spread nationwide with Utah also contemplating label restrictions similar to Ohio’s and the legislatures of Missouri and Kansas considering bills to restrict “absence” claims. Pennsylvania proposed but withdrew a similar regulation. It also followed the announcement by Wal-Mart Stores, the leading U.S. food retailer, that it would sell own-label milk from rBST-free cows. Wal-Mart has not said whether it would put a claim on labels. A spokeswoman said only that the retailer was “considering our options on labels.”

Posted with permission.

I posted a press release on August 3, 2007 from the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) about a recent outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom.

On August, 8, 2007 the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the UK posted information that addresses potential breaches in biosecurity that may be linked to the outbreak. The HSE Report is presented below.

As discussed in the HSE Report, the FMD strain identified at the index farm was being worked on at the Institute for Animal Health (IAH) and Merial Animal Health Ltd. The farm is about 16 miles from these facilities. The HSE Report indicates that there is a strong probability that the strain involved in the farm outbreak originated from the IAH or the Merial sites. A question of great importance is whether this was an accidental or intended transfer of the virus from IAH or Merial. IF it is determined that the outbreak was the result of an intentional transfer from IAH or Merial, we will have witnessed a bioterrorism attack. However, in the absence of an admission, establishing this in a definitive way will be extraordinarily difficult, and I encourage readers to not jump to premature conclusions about the cause of the outbreak. However, readers must appreciate that the consequences of a bioterrorism attack(s) on animal agriculture are enormous (see Impact of Bioterrorism on Agriculture in the U.S.).

The Health and Safety Executive Report, August 8, 2007

• An outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV) was confirmed at a farm in Surrey on 3 August 2007.
• Preliminary DEFRA investigations indicated that the virus may have originated from the Pirbright site at which two separate organizations are based: the IAH and Merial.
• A multidisciplinary cross-government team with representatives from HSE, DEFRA, the Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD) and the Environment Agency (EA) supported by others, conducted on-site investigations on 5, 6 and 7 August.
• This initial report outlines the investigation’s key lines of inquiry and the next steps planned as of 7 August 2007.

Purpose of the Investigation

The Health and Safety Executive was asked by the Government to lead a team to investigate any potential breaches of biosecurity at the IAH and Merial sites; whether such breaches may have led to a release of any specified animal pathogen and whether any such breaches had been rectified to prevent future incidents. A multidisciplinary team was assembled with expertise in a wide range of relevant areas, including in investigation; in working with highly infectious viruses; in engineering control systems relevant to containment; in veterinary medicine production; and in management systems for controlling risk and environmental protection issues.

The Legal Position

The primary legal requirement applying to the site is the Specified Animal Pathogens Order 1998, enforced by DEFRA, which requires licensing of work with FMDV. HSE’s primary remit is to regulate the health and safety of staff at IAH and the Merial sites and to regulate (jointly with DEFRA) human health and environmental risks from work involving genetically modified organisms (GMOs) at the IAH.

What We Did

• We concentrated on biosecurity issues associated with FMDV strain O1BFS67 as this was the strain associated with the outbreak.
• We concentrated on the time frame between 14 and 25 July 2007 as this was advised by DEFRA to be the most likely period of infection.
• We investigated whether or not this strain was in use at the IAH and Merial sites in that time frame and the precise nature of any activities undertaken.
• We investigated whether or not there had been any lapses in control measures which could have led to a breach in biosecurity and whether these could be linked to the outbreak.

To do this we carried out inspections of all facilities of both the IAH and Merial sites where the FMDV strain is handled. This involved checking key biosecurity measures including engineering controls, management systems, working practices and a review of the record logs. We reviewed documents, interviewed staff and visually inspected all the facilities.

What We Found
The following key lines of inquiry were investigated:

Identifying the virus strain

• We confirmed that the FMDV strain found at the outbreak farm was being worked on at both organizations at both the IAH and Merial sites during the period between 14 and 25 July 2007. This involved large scale production at the Merial site (10,000 liters) and a series of small scale experiments (less than 10 ml in each case) at the IAH site.
• We have initiated further studies intended to provide additional molecular information on the virus types in use at both organizations. This requires detailed technical analysis and the results are not available for inclusion in this report but are expected within a week.

Subject to the ongoing work detailed above, the indications are that there is a strong probability that the FMDV strain involved in the farm outbreak originated from the IAH or the Merial sites.

Potential for airborne release from the site

• We found no evidence of any working practices or incidents such as laboratory spillages or leakages from plant or equipment which could have led to a release of the FMDV strain within the contained working environment at either organization.
• We confirmed that all air being discharged to atmosphere from the contained working environments is first passed through a minimum of two high-efficiency particulate (HEPA) air filters.
• We confirmed that there is continuous monitoring of the pressures of the ventilation systems of the facility and that the HEPA filters are routinely integrity-tested in line with regulatory requirements.
• Examination of local wind conditions for the period indicates that there was only a very limited period during which the wind could have acted as a transmission link. This would have had to coincide with a release of virus through the ventilation system. We found no evidence of such a release.

We are further exploring the meteorological data, but at this stage, we consider there to be a negligible combined likelihood that there was an airborne release from the IAH or the Merial sites which was subsequently transferred to the first affected farm between the 14 and 25 July 2007.

Potential for waterborne release from the site

• We established that two separate effluent treatment systems exist on Pirbright site: one services the animal isolation unit at the IAH; the second services both the remainder of the IAH site together with the Merial site.
• We established that the effluent treatment system servicing the IAH animal isolation unit employs a thermal inactivation process. There was no evidence of it operating unsatisfactorily between the 14 and 25 July 2007.
• We established that the effluent treatment system servicing the remainder of the IAH site together with the Merial site employs a chemical inactivation process. Whilst control measures are in place at both premises to require chemical treatment of liquid effluent before it enters the system, a number of biosecurity issues have arisen which are subject to ongoing investigation. These include:
  • the integrity of the system and all associated pipework;
  • the potential for the FMD Virus to have entered this system during the specified time period;
  • whether heavy rain and flooding during the period may have overwhelmed this system;
  • whether any contaminated material could have been transferred between the IAH and Merial sites and the first affected farm.
• For virus to have escaped from the effluent pipe, this would have required a failure in the intermediate inactivation process either at the Merial or IAH site and this would have had to coincide with the flooding.

Waterborne release onto the site remains a possibility. But preliminary investigations into the possibility of whether surface water from flooding from the site could have reached and contaminated the affected farm have indicated that this was negligible due to the distance, topography and direction of flow. These issues are being investigated further.

Potential for Release from the Site by Human Movements

There are various potential routes for accidental or deliberate transfer of material from the site. We have investigated site management systems and records and spoken to a number of employees. As a result we are pursuing lines of inquiry.

Release by human movement must also be considered a real possibility. Further investigation of the above issues is required and is being urgently pursued.

The Next Steps

We will continue with our work and report further as necessary. This report also provides a basis for the independent review of biosecurity arrangements to be led by Professor Spratt of Imperial College. We are briefing Professor Spratt and his team and will also offer him continuing support.

Following an investigation of suspected vesicular disease by Animal Health on a holding near Guildford in Surrey, United Kingdom, laboratory results have this evening indicated that the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) virus is present in samples from cattle on the premises.

On the basis of the initial laboratory results Debby Reynolds, UK Chief Veterinary Officer has confirmed Foot and Mouth Disease. In accordance with the legislation and contingency planning arrangements all the cattle on the premises will be culled. A Protection Zone of three kilometers radius and a Surveillance Zone of 10 kilometers has been placed around the premises, and a national movement ban of all ruminants and pigs has been imposed.

Nationally no animal movements are allowed except under license, controls are in place on movement of animal carcasses, animal gatherings, shearing and dipping are restricted, and all farms must increase levels of biosecurity. In both the Protection and Surveillance Zones, there will be requirements for increased levels of biosecurity on farms, movement controls, controls on transportation of dung/manure and treatment of animal products to ensure destruction of the FMD virus.

The farm itself has been under restrictions since late on Thursday evening when symptoms were reported to the local Animal Health office. A 1km temporary restriction zone was placed around the premises earlier today whilst investigations and testing were completed, in line with domestic and EU legislation.

According to an article published in FoodNaviator.com, Unilever, the parent company of Ben & Jerry’s, one of the most visible anti-biotechnology ice cream makers in the United States, has moved closer to gaining approval in Europe to use an ice-structuring protein (ISP) isolated from genetically modified yeast.

In their Summary, the Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes of the United Kingdom Food Standards Committee stated they were satisfied by the evidence provided by Unilever that the range of uses for its ice structuring protein preparation is acceptable, subject to the applicant’s adherence to the proposed specification and the production parameters described above.

An interesting paradox isn’t it? Ben & Jerry’s attacks the use of rbST in the dairy industry, which is perfectly safe. Yet, their parent company, Unilever is seeking regulatory approval in Europe to use ISP isolated from yeast that have been genetically engineered to produce ISP.

My view – it is wonderful science. Wonder what the folks at Ben & Jerry’s think?

Read more about this in the Foodnavigator.com article below.

Unilever moves closer with GM ice cream protein

By Jess Halliday
Foodnavigator.com

4/10/2007 – Low fat ice cream made using a GM yeast moved closer to being approved for the European market, as the FSA published its draft opinion on Unilever technology under novel foods regulation.

The consumer goods firm applied to the UK’s Food Standards Agency (FSA) for novel foods approval to use ice-structuring proteins derived from a fermented genetically modified baker’s yeast last year.

The draft opinion that the ISP preparation is acceptable subject to proposed parameters, on which the FSA is currently eliciting comments,is a step towards Unilever gaining the go-ahead for Europe. However the agency opines that consumers should be made aware that products made using the ISP, even though the GM yeast cells are removed from the final product.

ISPs are naturally occurring proteins and peptides found in living organisms such as fish, which protect them from tissue damage in very cold conditions by modifying the size and shape of ice-crystals.

Unilever found that type III ISPs from the cold water fish ocean pout could be used in ice-cream products to make a large number of very small ice crystals, as opposed to the small number of large crystals produced by conventional freezing techniques.

This ice-structure enables different kinds of formulations, such as low-fat.

However since the it would be unsustainable to use proteins directly from the fish, Unilever developed a fermentation process using the GM yeast carrying the synthetic gene encoding for the ISP.

The European Commission stated in a recent report that ingredients produced by fermentation using GM micro-organisms not present in the final product do not fall under GM food legislation – and therefore do not need to be labelled as GM.

Although this applies to Unilever’s ISP, the FSA’s Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP) said this was a special case, on the grounds of “the use of a synthetic gene sequence and the presence…of a significant proportion of cellular by-products from the fermentation process such as yeast proteins”.

Thus, it recommends that consumers should be provided with information indicating that the ingredient is made using a GM yeast – either through information provided on food packaging or “via other easily accessible routes”.

Given that European public opinion remains largely opposed to GMOs, such information could potentially turn some consumers off the
products.

Moreover, the novel foods application, required since the ISO was not commonly used in foods in the EU prior to 1997, has already caused considerable controversy with anti-GM campaigners.

Last July scientists working on behalf of pressure group the Independent Science Panel submitted their findings to the FSA that the health and safety risks that have not been taken into account.

Such concerns are likely to resurface during the consultation on the initial draft opinion.

The transgenic protein has already been authorised in Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, the Unites States and the Philippines.

In addition to the GM labelling, the agency also said that products made using the ISP preparation should carry labels indicating yeast derivation, for the benefit of allergy sufferers.

There has been more response to the ABC News report on rbST that ran on April 12,2007. I had posted my initial response to the story in my Blog, “Got Any Idea What’s in Milk?” The focus of that that blog was to point out that the story was slanted and did not present the facts about rbST in an accurate manner!

Mr. Jon Wheeler, a dairy producer from Sunnyside, WA has shared his perspectives about the ABC report on Dairy-L. I believe it presents important issues for the dairy industry to consider, and I have posted it (with Mr. Wheeler’s permission).

Dairy-Lers,

If you are not totally enraged by this coverage on ABC……then I am disappointed in this industry. This coverage was pure media hype with no substance, truth or true investigative reporting. Definitely one sided! This type of media display of incompetence needs to be addressed.

Back to disparaging of milk……we as an industry are going to suffer in the long run. Yes, I said we. The conventional producers and the organic milk producers are going to suffer in the long run. As long as we within this industry continue to compete against each other claiming there is good milk and bad milk, we will all lose. We must stand up together and champion the benefits of milk. All Milk! And we will, and win.

We as an industry have to come together and sell milk as milk, and promote milk for it’s value. rbST is a valuable tool for producers. It is safe. It has been researched and tested many years. Whether you use rbST or not this will affect you and your price of milk. Let us not continue to let activists and the media tear this industry apart.

I urge you to contact ABC news and demand that they get all the facts and tell the true story. If you care about this industry, if you care about agriculture and if you care about this country, then pull your heads out of the sand and make people accountable for what they are saying. This is AMERICA! In God we trust! Everyone else needs data…….let’s make sure we give them the correct data!

Take the time to view this clip from ABC news, which aired Thursday 4-12-07.

Jon Wheeler
Sunnyside, WA.

The vulnerability of agriculture in the United States to attack has been the subject of numerous reviews, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

However, a large proportion of the public remains unaware of the complexities and scale of agriculture from “farm to fork” in the U.S., and clearly does not appreciate the vulnerability of our agricultural assets. Agriculture in the U.S. is remarkably robust from a standpoint of productivity and efficiency in the food distribution chain but dangerously fragile because of countless vulnerabilities that could be exploited. There are few events that would cause more economic damage than a widespread attack on the agriculture infrastructure in the U.S. This article will address some of those vulnerabilities and provide a brief overview of the impact that a targeted bioterrorism act(s) might have that exploits those vulnerabilities in agriculture.

Nature as a Terrorist

Nature acts in a reoccurring way as a “terrorist”. There are numerous examples throughout recorded history that have involved an array of human, animal and plant diseases. An example to illustrate the point is the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001 which had an economic impact of over £8 billion (about $10 billion); more than six million animals were slaughtered: four million for disease control and over two million for welfare reasons. An outbreak of FMD in the pig population in Taiwan in 1997 resulted in the virtual depopulation of domestic pigs on the island with huge economic costs including the loss of an estimated 50,000 job. A part of the economic impact is that Taiwan no longer has a viable pork export business. The economic impact of a positive diagnosis of BSE in a single cow in Washington in December 2003 impacted exports by about $2 billion. An outbreak of Nipah virus among pigs in Southeast Asia during 1999 resulted in large scale slaughter of animals to control disease spread. Nipah is a zoonotic disease that can be spread from pigs to humans. In humans, Nipha infection causes severe encephalitis. There was a 40% mortality rate among infected patients in Malaysia and Singapore with at least 109 fatalities. The virulent H5N1 avian influenza strain circulating in Asia and Central Europe has potential to create a $5 billion impact should this pathogen enter the U.S. poultry production environment, independent of the potential as a human disease pandemic pathogen. A significant portion of the impact would result from the collapse of export trade. Based on the foregoing brief overview, it must be emphasized that a bioterrorism attack on agriculture in the U.S. would have catastrophic impacts.

Foreign Animal Diseases (FAD)

Diseases and biological toxins have been used as weapons of war throughout recorded history. Several diseases of livestock species are so dangerous to the economy of disease–free trading partners as to warrant extraordinary measures. Among these diseases are the familiar names: Foot and Mouth Disease, African Swine Fever, Bovine Spongioform Encephalopathy, Rinderpest, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza and many others (a detailed list can be found at the Select Agent and Toxin List maintained by APHIS). Use of any of these causative agents for these diseases represents a serious threat to livestock populations as the result of an asymmetric biological attack.

Asymmetric Biological Attack on Agricultural Assets

The Department of Defense defines asymmetric strategies as attacks on vulnerabilities not appreciated by the target or that capitalize on limited preparation against the threat. Intended introduction of a biological agent(s) that targets food production in the U.S. is designed to create fear, societal chaos, and have a destabilizing effect on the economy and the functionality of government. No elaborate delivery technology would be needed for such an attack. Samples of infectious material obtained or cultured from infected animals or carcasses are all that would be required. Virulent contagious diseases are still common in a number of countries and accessible. There is evidence that terrorist groups have given strong consideration to this strategy. A document captured at Tarnak Farms in Afghanistan in 2001 revealed that al Q’aida aspired to develop biological agents as weapons to advance their agenda. Apparent in reviewing this document is that the food supply was envisioned as a delivery mechanism. This example is significant because awareness to this level of detail is indicative of sophisticated program planning. It is evident that the intentional introduction of a disease pathogen that targets animal agriculture and the subsequent effects on food production systems and export trade could be devastating. More important is that attribution would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove.

A recent example of an asymmetric attack occurred in New Zealand where a small group of farmers intentionally introduced a virulent rabbit pathogen (rabbit calicivirus disease) as a strategy to control the population of wild rabbits. This introduction was so effective that the disease is epizootic in New Zealand and threatens to spread beyond Oceana. The significance of this event is that a group of motivated individuals without much scientific training managed to research, acquire a source of the pathogen, and penetrate one of the best biosecurity systems in the world to unleash a hemorrhagic disease virus on the rabbit population in New Zealand.

Summary

The use of foreign animal disease pathogens to inflict economic damage to an adversary’s agricultural productivity, either through a State-sponsored initiative (biological warfare) or through several terrorism models would have potentially catastrophic effects. The possibility of preventing an asymmetric attack(s) is at best daunting. Regional and local consequences would have Katrina-like similarities; large numbers of individuals applying for unemployment insurance, rise in health care costs due to treatment for mental illness, inability to meet mortgage payments, possibly closing of all public services and facilities due to movement restrictions, and the news media broadcasting to the entire U.S. population in near real-time every detail and attempt at disaster plan execution including large scale slaughter of animals to control disease spread. It is not easy to answer the questions of how bad an agricultural bioterrorist event would be in the U.S. However, the preponderance of evidence is that it would be potentially devastating to agribusiness and likely challenging to national security. A huge challenge will be to find ways to reduce the likelihood of an attack and the subsequent impact on society.